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Abstract 
 
There have been a number of steganography em-
bedding techniques proposed over the past few years. 
In turn, there has been great interest in steganalysis 
techniques as the embedding techniques improve. Spe-
cifically, universal steganalysis techniques have be-
come more attractive since they work independently of 
the embedding technique. In this work, we examine the 
effectiveness of a basic universal technique that relies 
on some knowledge about the cover media, but not the 
embedding technique.   We examine images as a cover 
media, and examine how a single technique that we 
call steganographic sanitization performs on 26 differ-
ent steganography programs that are publicly avail-
able on the Internet.  Our experiments are completed 
using a number of secret messages and a variety of 
different levels of sanitization.   We benchmark the 
level of sanitizing versus the subsequent detection ca-
pability by trying to extract the hidden message after 
the sanitizing process  However, since our intent is to 
remove covert communication, and not authentication 
information, we continue by examining how well the 
sanitization process preserves authentication informa-
tion such as watermarks and digital fingerprints. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Steganography literally means “covered writing” 
and dates back to the ancient Greeks where message 
runners would have messages tattooed to their shaven 
heads and dispatched once the hair grew back.  Upon 
arrival at their destination, the head was once again 
shaven and the message could then be read.  Other 
methods included carved messages on wooden tables 
that were later covered in wax.  Today, steganography 
is the science of hiding information by embedding cov-
ert messages within other, seemingly harmless pieces of 
data.  Steganography works by replacing bits of unused 
or imperceptible areas in regular computer files (such 
as graphics, sound, text, video data, etc) with bits of 
different information. This hidden information can be 
plain text, cipher text, or any other form of digital data 
such as images, documents and schematics.  
Steganography is sometimes used when encryption 
is not permitted.  Or, more commonly, steganography 
is used to supplement encryption. An encrypted file 
may still hide information using steganography, so 
even if the encrypted file is eventually deciphered, the 
hidden message is not seen.   Conversely, encrypted 
messages can be hidden in non-encrypted data to cir-
cumvent the rules that disallow encryption.  Moreover, 
should the hidden communication be found, depending 
on the encryption scheme it could be very difficult to 
determine what the message really is. 
Steganalysis is the science of discovering such cov-
ert messages embedded in the media.  The idea behind 
detecting steganographic communication is, that once 
discovered, it can be dealt with.  However discovery 
techniques rely largely on statistical based methods [1] 
that are becoming less effective as the information hid-
ing researchers begin to apply the basic principles of 
encryption: Randomness, large key spaces, uniform 
distribution, and the inability to allow sequence guess-
ing [2].  As the steganography techniques become more 
sophisticated at covertly hiding the embedded mes-
sages, steganalysis will become a more computationally 
intensive process.  
Given that information can be imperceptibly em-
bedded into a cover medium with very little computa-
tional expense, we claim that it is also possible to 
scramble the information in the cover medium where 
steganographic communications might exist, also with 
little computational overhead.  In this paper we ex-
perimentally examine the elimination of steganographic 
communication from cover media (in our tests we used 
images) on 26 different, publicly available Steganogra-
phy programs that we were able to get from the Internet 
In this paper we briefly review steganography, and 
steganalysis in Section 2.  We continue by examining 
what threats steganography can induce and what can be 
done to help deter those risks in Section 3.  Section 4 
discusses methods for eliminating steganographic 
communications.  In Section 5 we expose our experi-
mental results and show how one technique that uses 
only the knowledge of the cover medium can effec-
tively eliminate Steganography as a form of covert 
communication.  Finally in Section 6 we sum up our 
results and draw some conclusions. 
 
2. Overview of Steganography and Stega-
nalysis 
 
Steganography, as a process, can be simply ex-
plained as the embedding of one information source 
into another.  As we see in Figure 1, we embed our 
hidden message which is often called the payload.  The 
payload is embedded into a 2nd digital file often called 
the carrier.  The result is the stego-media that is per-
ceptually identical to the carrier. 
 
Figure 1: The steganographic embedding process 
 
 When we say imperceptible, we mean that the em-
bedding program should produce no obvious artifacts 
in the resulting stego-media that would bring suspicion 
on the media.  For example, in Figure 2, we present an 
image file to be used as carrier data.  In Figure 3 we 
present the stego media presented after a 194 kilobyte 
message has been embedded into the carrier data.  The 
message is actually the document you are reading right 
now.  As you will notice, you cannot see, nor would 
you know by simple inspection that information is “hid-
ing” within the image in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure2: Carrier data  
 
Figure 3: Stego-media with embedded document   
 
Embedding without visual artifacts allows the ob-
servation of the communication without raising any 
suspicions.  The ultimate intent of steganography is to 
maximize the communications bandwidth, minimize 
the perceptibility of the communication and ensure 
robustness of the embedding [3].  These three forces 
act in opposition to one another as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Tradeoffs in information embedding 
 
The fundamental conclusions we can draw from the 
above are the following: 
1. Imperceptible communication is not robust 
2. Embedding large messages is not robust 
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Moreover, we can infer that multiple small mes-
sages are more likely to be noticed and therefore less 
desirable by those who are willing to attempt covert 
communication.   
Steganalysis is the process of examining a message 
and looking for the existence of a covert message 
within the original message.  Loosely classified into 
passive and active steganalysis, passive steganalysis 
simply tries to detect the presence of a message while 
active analysis attempts to extract the message length 
and location, estimate the secret key used in the em-
bedding process, and ultimately extract the secret mes-
sage itself.  The methods to perform these tasks are 
largely statistical in nature [4,5,6,7].  However it is 
becoming much more difficult for statistical methods to 
detect the presence of steganographic embedding [8]. 
However, if our intent is to secure a network against 
covert communications, our efforts can be restricted to 
elimination of steganographic communication as a 
whole, rather than detection of specific instances.  We 
next provide a detailed analysis of the threat of steg-
anography to organizations. 
 
3. Steganography Threat Analysis  
 
While steganography may seem to be an excellent 
apparatus for the exchange of sensitive documents and 
information in a concealed manner, it can also be used 
in ways that are counter productive to our security 
measures.  Besides the examples of hidden files within 
pictures, there is speculation terrorists may be using 
steganographic techniques to communicate via seem-
ingly innocent Web sites.  It seems to be inevitable that 
such techniques will grow in popularity among those 
who are trying to communicate and feel that secrecy is 
a very high priority.  Since the mere fact that two peo-
ple communicating can bring on suspicion by associa-
tion, there exists extremely high utility value in keeping 
the communication itself hidden.  It should come as 
little surprise that those who tend to engage in subver-
sive activities will also utilize all of the tools available 
to keep their actions (and associations) private. 
The core threat from steganography is lack of 
knowledge.  Vital information that is leaked out can 
have extremely dire consequences.  Since we may not 
be aware of the leak, there is no ability to counter or 
prepare for the subsequent attack.  As well, information 
can be sent into the organization.  Should there be a 
covert operative working on the inside, instructions and 
missions can be sent into the organization for the per-
son in question to execute on.  Furthermore, since any 
type of information (such as executable programs) can 
be hidden via steganography, it is feasible (with the aid 
of a covert operative) to infect the internal computer 
network.  Perhaps even bring down a critical infrastruc-
ture system. 
Although the main threat at the moment would seem 
to be of direct concern to national security, it is well 
within the realm of imagination that the technology can 
be used for purposes in the financial and commercial 
markets.  Information regarding money laundering, 
insider trading, the illegal drug trade, the distribution of 
child pornography and trafficking in humans can all be 
concealed using steganography.  Although steganogra-
phy is not yet the sort of threat that IT auditors and 
emergency preparedness officials will come up against 
on a regular basis, it is one that needs a thorough un-
derstanding.  Furthermore, a willingness to address 
methods to secure their organizations now will go a 
long way in preventing a disaster in the future. 
 
4. Eliminating Steganographic Communi-
cation  
 
Since detection and possible decryption of a covert 
message is computationally intense, it is not feasible to 
analyze every possible data item that passes through an 
organizations gateway.  However, steganographic sani-
tization is an extremely fast process that allows for the 
communication channel to be effectively scrubbed of 
covert communications.  While the solution itself does 
not lend any further information to find culprits of es-
pionage and mal-intent, it does help to secure the or-
ganization overall.   
 
 
Figure5: Strategy for removing covert messages. 
 
The Elimination strategy as outlined in Figure 5 has 
a three tier effect: 
1. Removes the network as a channel for cov-
ert communication. 
2. Allows further analysis of items in an off-
line situation and allows targeted analysis. 
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3. Forces the two communicating parties into 
further communication to determine what 
happened to the covert message. 
 
These effects provide the following benefits for the 
organizations security: 
1. Important information will not escape the 
organization forcing the covert operatives 
to use another more traditional (hopefully, 
easier to detect) form of communication. 
2. A more detailed analysis of the original 
media is possible, allowing for the poten-
tial detection of covert communication 
and subsequent target for further investi-
gation. 
3. An aura of confusion and mistrust may be 
created between the sending and receiving 
operatives.  This may force further com-
munication between the two parties using 
methods that are easier to detect. 
 
Finally, as we are sanitizing the entire channel, all 
communication that is not covert will also be scrubbed.  
Since the sanitized data is imperceptibly changed, the 
recipients of “clean” data should not notice our inter-
ference.  We continue with a theoretical analysis of the 
elimination strategy followed by a detailed explanation 
of our implemented strategy. 
 
4.1 Game Theory Analysis of the Elimination 
Strategy 
 
Steganography is the study of information hidden 
within a carrier host data set.  A message is hidden in 
the carrier data is sent in a covert way designed to be 
imperceptible to a casual analysis.  An attacker (war-
den) may seek to detect the presence of the message, 
and may introduce additional distortion in an attempt to 
destroy the hidden message. Ultimately, the resulting 
data set is analyzed using information shared with the 
information hider (such as a decryption key) to extract 
the hidden message. Thus, there is a game between the 
information hider and the attacker (warden).  
The attacker (warden) seeks to minimize informa-
tion communicated while the information hider seeks to 
maximize it. The value of the mutual information for 
the pair of hiding and attack strategies bounds the com-
munication rate for the information hider. Since the 
warden determines the channel subject to a distortion 
constraint, the optimal attack strategy is the solution of 
a rate-distortion problem. Hence, the optimal attack is 
equivalent to optimal data compression subject to a 
distortion constraint, with the information hider deter-
mining the distribution on the carrier data. Since the 
information hider determines the input distribution to 
the channel, the optimal hiding strategy corresponds to 
the solution of a constrained channel capacity problem. 
Hence, the optimal hiding strategy is equivalent to op-
timal channel coding, with the warden determining the 
channel transition probabilities. The optimal pair of 
strategies is then a saddle point for the conditional mu-
tual information function [5].   
Classical game theory suggests that that this may 
indicate a model of a zero sum matrix game that can 
have optimal strategies.  Mark Ettinger, of Los Alamos 
National Labs had performed an analysis of a game of 
steganography with a 2 players [5].  The first player 
intends to pass messages using steganography while the 
second intends to remove the message.  This game ex-
actly models our method of steganographic sanitization 
via an email server.  His analysis shows that the attack-
ers (the person removing hidden information) optimal 
strategy includes the flipping of all of the bits, which 
distorts the image beyond recognition.  Not very useful 
when we intend to cleanse all data going through our 
communication channel. 
By finding an equilibria point for minimizing chan-
nel distortion, we found that an optimal strategy in this 
case is for the warden was to flip some of the least per-
ceptual bits in the image.  Our methods meet this re-
quirement and, in fact, exceed the equilibria require-
ments by randomizing the areas where perception of 
the distortion would be minimized.  Remember that 
equilibria means that no player benefits from changing 
their strategy and this does not necessarily mean that 
the strategy is optimal.  The optimal strategy does, in 
fact, include flipping all bits that allow the distortion to 
be minimized; our method performs a variant on this 
strategy since the optimal strategy is easily reversed.  
 
4.2 Our Elimination Strategy 
 
Our elimination strategy takes into account that we 
know the type of carrier media and takes advantage of 
this knowledge.  While we focus on images for our 
experimental evaluations, the concepts behind the 
method could be applied to other carrier types as well.  
We rely on the basic idea that if one can imperceptibly 
embed information into an image, one should be able to 
imperceptibly remove the hidden information by alter-
ing the areas where extra information can be hidden.  
Effectively if the hiding places are so unnecessary to 
the visual quality of an image, then there is no harm in 
randomizing these areas.  This method while conceptu-
ally simple has several implementation complexities 
that we will discuss next. 
As we discussed earlier, the optimal strategy would 
be to flip all of the bits in the image, however, this 
would distort the image content beyond recognition.  
Initially one may assume that you want to apply the 
optimal strategy to only the hiding areas within the 
carrier data file.  This would, in essences, make the 
data as different as possible from the original, but it is 
much too simple to reverse the process by simply in-
verting all the bits of the extracted data.  This forces us 
into a less than optimal strategy of randomizing the bits 
that comprise the hiding places in the carrier media. 
Our approach to randomization is to employ encryp-
tion techniques with randomly generated key sets.  Re-
call that one of the core capabilities of a good encryp-
tion scheme is to make the output bit stream appear 
random.  The other important capability is that it is 
difficult to revert to the original bit string from the re-
sulting cyphertext.  To this end, we concatenate all of 
the bits that comprise all of the possible hiding areas in 
image data and consider this our source string H.  We 
then use the source string H as plaintext and proceed to 
encrypt the bits to produce the ciphertext string of bits 
C.  The final step is to replace the bits that comprise H 
in the image data with the bits from C of the ciphertext.   
 
 
Figure 6: Stego-media with embedded document   
 
Our approach will cause no more distortion than that 
of the steganography techniques themselves.  As Figure 
6 shows, there is no visual distortion that is apparent to 
the image after the steganographic sanitization process 
has been employed.  By exploiting the knowledge of 
where information can be hidden in an image we are 
able to effectively remove hidden information.  How-
ever, the technique of sanitization is subject to the typi-
cal hacker/security arms race.  Should there be a dis-
covery of new areas in the image data, the construction 
of the plaintext string H needs to be adjusted to take 
that into account.  For example, some common hiding 
places for information in image data include LSB 
(Least Significant Bits), DCT (Discrete Cosine Trans-
form) coefficients, and DWT (Discrete Wavelet Trans-
form) coefficients for which our method considers. 
 
5. Experimental Evidence 
 
We have conducted a large number of experiments 
using steganography programs that are publicly avail-
able on the Internet.  In recent years, the number of 
publicly available steganography programs has reduced 
due to global events and suspected terrorist use of these 
programs.  None-the-less we were able to find and suc-
cessfully use a total of twenty-six different steganogra-
phy programs when testing our elimination strategy.   
Our tests involved embedding multiple different types 
of information into the images that were used as the 
carrier data, followed by a steganographic sanitization, 
followed by an attempt to retrieve the initially embed-
ded data.  The result of the data retrieval was judged 
using a binary decision: Was the data successfully re-
trieved and usable?  Furthermore, we performed a 
qualitative visual analysis of the images to determine 
whether or not a perceptible change had occurred as a 
result of our sanitization process.  Finally, we also con-
ducted a “load and save” test that loaded the stego-
media and simply resaved the image, applying appro-
priate compression algorithms where necessary.   The 
time required to sanitize a typical image (2 mega pix-
els) is less than 500 milliseconds which has little im-
pact in a practical implementation of an SMTP filter, 
WWW proxy server or firewall. 
Our results, outlined in Table 1, indicate that clearly 
some embedding techniques are susceptible to lossy 
image compression such as JPEG, and that non-
compressed images are not affected by a save and load 
situation.  This result is not surprising since the com-
pression algorithms can be considered a form of chan-
nel distortion by removing elements of the image data 
that are not visually important.  For example, the JPEG 
compression reduces the colour range of an image and 
blurs the edge boundaries slightly.  In essence, by re-
saving an image with JPEG compression, we are alter-
ing the DCT table where information was hidden. 
Our tests were also run on 3 levels of additive dis-
tortion for each steganographic embedding software.  
Outlined in Table 1, we were able to successfully sani-
tize images from all 26 methods using level 2 or higher, 
and most were sanitized with only level one distortion.  
But in all 3 levels of distortion, the qualitative analysis 
was unable to notice the distortion.  
Since we are looking to remove covert communica-
tion and leave typical communicators unaware of our 
interference, it is fundamentally important that we also 
do not remove watermarking information that is used to 
authenticate images and protect against copyright vio-
lators.  In our next experiment we examine the effec-
tiveness of the sanitization process in maintaining wa-
termark information.  As Table 2 outlines, most water-
mark embeddings tested were not affected by our sani-
tization process at the lowest level of distortion.  How-
ever as we increased the distortion level, the water-
marks were being removed more often.  Recall, from 
Figure 4, that one of the tradeoffs in the feature triangle 
was robustness.  Since the watermark data is small, 
watermarking systems are able to apply redundant em-
beddings to increase the robustness.  As we increase 
the distortion level of our proposed method, we in-
crease coverage of the triangle from the top down. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Test results on 26 different steganography programs.  ? indicates failure, hidden information WAS NOT 
removed , ? -  indicates success, hidden information WAS removed, ? indicates that the steganography software 
does not support this carrier file type, or test scenario. 
Software Carrier 
File 
Message 
File 
Visual Inspection 
1-5 
 poor-good 
Scrambling steganographic areas 
for 3 different scramble levels and 
the load and save test results 
    1 2 3 Load & 
Save 
1. Stash-It! V 1.1 BMP 
 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Doc 
Zip 
Exe 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
2. Invisible Se-
crets 3 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Exe 
Txt 
Zip 
Exe 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
3. Jstep Shell 2.0 BMP 
JPG 
 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Exe 
 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
4. S Tools 4 BMP 
 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Exe 
 
5 
5 
5 
5 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
5. Steganos 3 BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
6. Hide in Pic-
ture 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
7. Contraband 
Hell  
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
8. Blindside BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
9. PGE10 BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
10. Stego 4 BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
11. Camouflage 
v1.2.1 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
12. Hide4PGP** BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
13. BMP Secrets BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
14. wbStego4 BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
15. Steganos v 
4.11 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
16. In Plain 
View 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
17. JP Hide and 
Seek  
BMP 
JPG 
 
Txt 
Zip 
 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
18. Courier 
V1.0a 
BMP 
 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Exe 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
19. Digital Pic-
ture Envelop 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
20. Hide and BMP Txt 5 ? ? ? ? 
Seek 95 v1.1  
 
JPG 
Zip 
Doc 
 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
21. Jsteg Shell 
v2.0 
BMP 
JPG 
 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Exe 
 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
22. MASKER 
v5.0 
BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
23. F5 BMP Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
24. WinStegano BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
25. Gif it Up GIF Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
26.  Stella BMP 
 
 
JPG 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
Txt 
Zip 
Doc 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
? 
 
 
Table 2: Results of sanitization process watermarked images from various programs.   
Software Watermark intact? 
 L1 L2 L3 
1. Picture Shark YES YES NO 
2. Alpvision YES NO NO 
3. ASI Watermark NO NO NO 
4. UniDream YES YES YES 
5. Trans Watermark YES YES YES 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Review 
 
National security is one example where steg-
anographic communication, if left unchecked, can 
have extremely dire consequences.  As steg-
anographic communication techniques become more 
sophisticated and appear to be statistically random, 
the detection of steganography will become more and 
more difficult, if not impossible to complete in a rea-
sonable time frame.  The alternative is to ensure that 
steganographic communication is not able to occur in 
the first place.  In this paper we have proposed a 
method that we call steganographic sanitization that 
uses knowledge of the carrier medium to cleanse all 
communication of possible steganographic content as 
it passes through a single point be it an SMTP server, 
a Web proxy server or a firewall.   
We have proposed a novel alternative method for 
securing a communication channel against steg-
anographic use by eliminating steganography rather 
than trying to detect it.  Moreover, we have shown 
that the method is an extremely successful method 
against publicly available steganography programs. 
Because detection is going to become even more 
computationally intensive, we believe that detection 
will not be possible in real time and our proposed 
sanitization process will allow the communication 
channel to remain open and subsist at a higher secu-
rity level.   
Our experiments show that our proposed method is 
extremely vigorous and capable of removing steg-
anographic messages from images without distorting 
the carrier data too greatly.  The sanitization process, 
while conceptually very simple, has many implemen-
tation complications that require domain expertise in 
each individual carrier data type that one hopes to 
secure.  Furthermore, the sanitization process does 
allow for subsequent detailed examination of carrier 
data without seriously degrading the communication 
channel bandwidth. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the strategy we have 
applied to image data is directly applicable to other 
forms of steganographic embedding.  Embeddings in 
audio files can be sanitized using the same process of 
enumerating the bits used by the information hiding 
processes and randomizing these bits subsequently in 
the sanitization process. 
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